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I. INTRODUCTION: A NEW BATTLE IN AN OLD WAR
In an online game preview for the "EA Sports NCAA Football 10" video
game, the starting quarterback for the University of Florida wears number
fifteen and has many of the physical attributes of the former Florida
quarterback, Tim Tebow.' In the same preview, the simulated University of
Texas starting quarterback, "QB #12," has many of the skills and physical
attributes of Texas's 2009 Heisman Trophy candidate, number twelve, Colt
McCoy. 2 The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the University
of Florida, Oklahoma University, and all other schools featured in "EA Sports
NCAA Football 10" receive a portion of profits from Electronic Arts, Inc.
(Electronic Arts), the producer of the video game, for the use of the NCAA's
and the schools' logos. 3 The college players arguably depicted in these games
receive no form of compensation.4
Proceeds from these licensing agreements are substantial. For the year-
ended August 31, 2009, the NCAA took in $594,527,482 in "Television and
Marketing Rights Fees," which includes revenues from licensing agreements.5
While these staggering numbers look more like the figures of a large
corporation, the NCAA is a non-profit organization that seeks to "maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the
athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear
line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports."6
But as college sports become a bigger business, it is more difficult to maintain a
definitive line between college and professional sports.7 With each new college
sports marketing device there is a battle over college athletes' rights to
compensation.8 So far, the NCAA is winning the war over college athlete
I EA Sports, NCAA Football 10 Gameplay, http://www.easports.com/media/play/feature-
video/NCAAFB10CentralGamePlay (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).
2 Id.
3 Electronic Arts, Inc., Legal Notices, http://www.ea.com/2/legal-notices (last visited Sept. 4,
2010).
4 NCAA, 2009-10 NCAA DIvISION I MANUAL: CONSTITUTION, OPERATING BYLAWS,
ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAws EFFEcTIvE AUGUST 1, 2009 § 12.1.2.1 (2009), available at http://www.
ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D1 10.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).
5 NCAA, 2008-09 NCAA Membershp Report, at 26, available at http://catalog.proemags.com/
publication/cc5da338# (last visited Sept. 4, 2010).
6 NCAA, supra note 4, § 1.3.
7 See Matthew G. Matzkin, Geltin' Played. How the Video Game Industry Violates College Athletes'
Rights of Pubdty by Not Paying for Their Likenesses, 21 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 227, 237 (2001)
(stating that "[diespite the ever growing commercial nature of collegiate sports and the NCAA's
role in increasing the member institutions' total income, the NCAA still claims its primary goal is
preserving the concept of amateurism among its athletes").
8 See, e.g., James S. Thompson, University Trading Cards: Do College Athletes Enjoy a Common Law
Rsght to Pubkdty?, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 143 (1994) (discussing college athletes' rights to
compensation for use of their likenesses in trading cards); Sean Hanlon & Ray Yasser, '].J.
Morrison" and his Right of Pubdity Lawsuit Against the NCAA, 15 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 241
2712010]
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compensation.9 One of the latest battles in this war is the increasing drive to
compensate college athletes for the use of their likenesses in sports video games
like the one described above.' 0
While this issue has been debated since the birth of the college sports video
game genre, recent technological advances making video games more lifelike
have forced this debate into the courtroom. Since May of 2009, a slew of cases
have been filed against Electronic Arts, the licensed producer of the NCAA
college football and basketball video games; the NCAA; and the College
Licensing Company (CLC), which manages the intellectual property of the
NCAA and approximately 200 colleges, universities, bowl games, and athletic
conferences (collectively Defendants)." These cases have since been combined
into a single action tided In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Lizgation (the Likeness Licensing Liigation).12 The Amended Complaint for the
consolidated case (Amended Consolidated Complaint) alleges, inter alia,'3 that
the college athletes have been deprived of their right of publicity.14 To resolve
this litigation, the court must decide whether video games appropriate the
likenesses of college athletes; and if so, whether college athletes should be
compensated for the use of their likenesses in these video games.
This Note will analyze the college athlete's right of publicity in the context
of the current legal dispute over the use of college athletes' likenesses in video
games. Part II will discuss the right of publicity, the NCAA Bylaws, the Likeness
Licensing Ligaion pertaining to college athletes' rights of publicity, and some of
the payment suggestions that have been offered by proponents of student-
(2008) (discussing college athletes' rights to compensation for use of their likenesses in apparel
and other merchandise).
9 See Alfred Dennis Mathewson, By Education or Commerce: The Legal Basis for the Federal
Regulation of the Economic Structure of Intercollegiate Athletics, 76 UMKC L. REV. 597, 603 (2008)
(discussing how courts have refused to allow compensation for college athletes).
10 See infra Part II.E.
"1 Class Action Complaint, Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 09-1967-CV (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2009).
See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, O'Bannon v. NCAA, No. 09-3329-CV (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2009);
Class Action Complaint, Bishop v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 09-4128-CV (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2009);
Class Action Complaint, Newsome v. NCAA, No. 09-4882-CV (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009).
12 Order Granting Plaintiffs Samuel Michael Keller's and Edward C. O'Bannon, Jr.'s Joint
Motion to Consolidate Actions, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litigation, No. C 09-1967 CW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010) (consolidating Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (No.
09-01967), O'Bannon v. NCAA (No. 09-03329), Bishop v. Elec. Arts, Inc. (No. 09-04128), Newsome v.
NCAA (No. 09-04882), Anderson v. NCAA (No. 09-05100), Wimprine v. NCAA (No. 09-05134),
Jacobson v. NCAA (No. 09-05372), and Rhodes v. NCAA (No. 09-05378)).
13 While the Amended Consolidated Complaint states claims for civil conspiracy, unfair
business practices, antitrust and breach of contract, this Note will only discuss the right of
publicity causes of action.
14 Amended Complaint Consolidating Amended Class Action Complaint, In re NCAA
Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation at 135-137, No. C 09-1967 CW (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Amended Consolidated Complaint] (enumerating the right of publicity
causes of action). See infra Part II.E.
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athlete compensation for rights of publicity use. Involved in this discussion is
the history of the right of publicity and how it has been applied to video games
and college athletes, as well as an explanation of the NCAA bylaws related to a
college athlete's amateur status. Part III will evaluate if and how college sports
video games are constitutionally protected works under the First Amendment
and under states' freedom of speech rights. This part also explains how
attempting to compensate college athletes for the use of their likenesses in
video games is logistically unrealistic because of the accounting and
management expenses that would be incurred in distributing profits to the
hundreds of college athletes that would arguably be entitled to compensation.
Finally, this Note will conclude that college athletes should not be compensated
for the use of their likenesses in video games because video games are
expressive works protected by the right to free speech, because college athletes
have contractually agreed to give up their right of publicity to play NCAA
sports, and because any potential compensation structure would be too costly
and convoluted to implement effectively.
II. BACKGROUND: THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, THE LIKENESS LICENSING
LITIGATION, AND EVERYTHING IN BETWEEN
A. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
1. Ongins of the Right of Publicity. The year 1953 marked the birth of the right
of publicity.'5  The seminal case, which primarily concerned intentional
interference with contractual relations over the sale of baseball cards, is now
noted for its assertion that "in addition to and independent of that right of
privacy ... a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph ... [t]his
right might be called a 'right of publicity.' "16 In the year following this case,
Professor Melville B. Nimmer wrote an article that became the substantive
foundation of the right of publicity.'7 This article recognized the inadequacy of
privacy laws in governing the use of celebrities' personas.18 It also set out
guidelines for what and who the right of publicity covers. 9 After Haelan and
the Nimmer article, courts began to define the parameters of the right of
15 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:26 (2d ed. 2005).
16 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
17 See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of.Pubkdly, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954); Steven
J. Hoffman, Limitaions on the Right of Pubdlcy, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 111 (1980) (stating the
importance of Nimmer's article to the development of the right of publicity); I MCCARTHY, supra
note 15, § 1:27.
18 Nimmer, supra note 17, at 204-09 (discussing how privacy rights are inadequate because (1)
they only apply when the celebrity has been defamed and (2) they are nonassignable).
19 Id at 212 (professing that the right of publicity should apply when the likeness is used for
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publicity. Since then, the protection of this right has been afforded to an
individual's identity, which includes one's physical likeness, 20 voice, 21 and name
or nickname.22
The right of publicity is a property right distinct from trademark, copyright,
and privacy law. 23 Through judicial precedent and the enactment of state
statutes, the right of publicity has become clearly defined. 24  It is now
recognized as "a right inherent to everyone to control the commercial use of
identity and persona and recover in court damages and the commercial value of
an unpermitted taking."25 As of 2009, thirty states recognize the right of
publicity in some form.26
2. Free Speech and the Right of Publiity. This right of publicity does not come
without limitations.27 The First Amendment right to free speech must be
balanced with an individual's right of publicity.28 In 1977, the United States
Supreme Court decided its first, and only, right of publicity case.29 In Zacchini v.
Scrps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Court, in a five to four decision, held that the
First Amendment right to free speech restricts an individual's claim to a right of
publicity.30 The language of this decision creates only a narrow rule, but one
definite takeaway is that the First Amendment does not bar all right of publicity
20 See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding
that a well-known professional driver was entitled to relief for the misappropriation of his
likeness where an advertisement used a person and car that could reasonably be mistaken for the
driver).
21 See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (deciding that an advertisement
using a "sound alike" of a famous singer created a cause of action in tort).
22 See Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that a famous
basketball player who changed his name has an action for violation of his right of publicity against
a car company that used his former name in an advertisement).
23 J. Thomas McCarthy & Paul M. Anderson, Protection of the Athete's Identity: The Right of
Pubhtiy, Endorsements and Domain Names, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 195, 198 (2001).
24 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, S 6:3 (discussing the development and status of the right of
publicity in the fifty states).
25 l id. 1:3.
26 1 id. 6:3 (stating that as of March 2009, "courts have expressly recognized the right of
publicity as existing under the common law of 20 states. Of those, eight also have statutory
provisions broad enough to encompass the right of publicity. In addition, ten states have statutes
which, while some are labeled 'privacy' statutes, are worded in such a way that most aspects of the
right of publicity are embodied in those statutes.").
27 JAMES CHARLES SMITH ET AL., PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 24 (Vicki Been et al. eds.,
Aspen Publishers 2d ed. 2008); see McCarthy & Anderson, supra note 23, at 198 (describing how
the right of publicity is not unbridled, but limited by free speech considerations).
28 SMITH FT AL., supra note 27, at 24.
29 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); 2 McCARTHY, supra note 15,
5 8:24.
30 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578 (holding that while state laws may give media privilege to broadcast
matters of public interest, the First Amendment requires such privilege with matters that would
otherwise be protected by the right of publicity).
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claims.31 Thus, it has been left to the states to balance the interests between the
right of publicity and free speech.32  Courts have created different tests for
determining what the right of publicity should protect.33  The general
conclusion of these tests is that a violation of one's right of publicity is
recognized only when the individual's persona is appropriated for purely
commercial purposes.34 While the effect is the same, there are different
methods that courts use to achieve this conclusion.
One such test is definitional in nature. The issue is whether the likeness is
used in "commercial speech" or "communicative speech." 35 If the persona is
used without authorization in commercial speech, it is a violation of the
individual's right of publicity; however, if the use is communicative, the work is
protected free speech.36 This does not wholly restrict unauthorized uses of an
individual's persona in products that are sold for profit.37 Rather, where the
plaintiffs likeness is used directly for a commercial purpose, such as a billboard
or television product advertisement, the individual whose persona is
appropriated will be protected by the right of publicity.38
A second test asks whether the plaintiffs persona is "wholly unrelated" to
the substance of the work, or if it is " 'simply a disguised commercial
advertisement for the sale of goods or services.' "39 This "Rogers test," from the
Second Circuit case Rogers v. Grimaldi, applies only to "expressive works."40 A
work is expressive if it passes a two-part test. The first part asks if the plaintiffs
likeness has artistic relevance to the underlying work.41 If the answer is no, then
it is not protected by the First Amendment. 42 If the likeness does have artistic
31 2 McCARTHY, supra note 15, § 8:27.
32 See 2 id. 6:3 (enumerating the states that recognize the right of publicity).
33 See 2 id. § 8:23 (showing how different courts have balanced the right of publicity and the
First Amendment right to free speech).
34 McCarthy & Anderson, supra note 23, at 198.
35 Id. at 202.
36 Id
37 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (stating the fact that the
advertisement in question was paid for was immaterial to a determination of whether the First
Amendment provided protection); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 868
(Cal. 1979) ("The First Amendment is not limited to those who publish without charge ... the
activity ... does not lose its constitutional protection because it is undertaken for profit."); ETW
Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829, 836 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (deciding that a portrait of a
professional athlete that was sold for profit was not a violation of the athlete's right of publicity
because it is an artistic work).
38 See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that the use
of a famous athlete's name in an advertisement commercial was not newsworthy, so it was not
entitled to First Amendment protection).
39 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlawp,
Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768, 769 (N.Y.A.D. 1980)).
40 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 8:71.
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relevance, the second part asks if the use of the likeness "explicitly misleads as
to the source or the content of the work."43 If the answer to the second part is
yes, the work is not protected by the First Amendment." This second part of
the test seeks to balance the risk that the use of a celebrity's likeness may be
mistaken as endorsement with the risk of unconstitutionally restricting artistic
expression.45
A third way to resolve whether a work deserves First Amendment free
speech protection is to determine whether the work is "transformative."46 In
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gay Saderup, Inc., the California Supreme Court
borrowed this factor of the fair use test from copyright law. 47 The question, as
posed by this court, is "whether a product containing a celebrity's likeness is so
transformed that it has become primarily the defendant's own expression rather
than the celebrity's likeness." 48 In answering this question, the court must
consider if the celebrity's likeness is the "sum and substance" of the work, and
whether the imitative or creative elements of the work predominate.49 This test
has been adopted especially in the context of visual artistic works that appear in
a non-advertising context.50
In 2003, the California Supreme Court applied the "transformative" test set
forth in Comedy III to a case in which plaintiffs claimed that characters in a series
of comic books violated their rights of publicity.5 In Winter v. DC Comics, the
characters in question were half-human, half-worm brothers whose last name
was "Autumn."52 The Winter Brothers, well-known singers, alleged that the
characters constituted illegal appropriations of their likenesses.53 The court
decided that because the plaintiffs' likenesses were only part of the "raw
materials" that made up the creative characters and not the "sum and
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See id. at 1001 (stating that "Ginger and Fred" was not explicitly misleading because there
was only a slight risk that the title would imply endorsement, which was outweighed by the
danger in restricting artistic expression).
4 See Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001) (establishing
what is now known as the "transformative" test to determine whether a work is entitled to First
Amendment protection) [hereinafter Comedy Ill]. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001); Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003) (both
applying the "transformative" test).
47 Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 807-08.
48 Id. at 809.
49 Id
50 See id. at 802 (acknowledging that the "transformative" test did not concern commercial
speech or advertising in this case). See also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 8:72 (discussing the
contexts in which the "transformative" test should be used).
51 Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).
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substance," the comic books were protected by the First Amendment as
"transformative." 54
3. The Right of Publicity Applied to Video Games. One specific setting in which
the "transformative" test has been applied is in video games.55 These cases
reaffirm the basis of the "transformative" test, that a video game must add
"new expression" beyond mere imitation of the celebrity.5 6 In IGrby v. Sega of
America, Inc., a California case, the court declared that "[v]ideo games are
expressive works entitled to as much First Amendment protection as the most
profound literature."57 The Irby court acknowledged that differences in the
plaintiff and the game's character were sufficient to constitute "something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message."58 Thus, the video game in Kirby was granted
First Amendment protection based on the determination that the game was an
"expressive work" that was transformative in nature. 59
4. The College Athlete's Right of Publiity. For purposes of this Note, a survey
of the law of the right of publicity would be incomplete without discussing how
it has been applied to college athletes. Most right of publicity sports cases
concern professional athletes, which may be due in part to the NCAA
amateurism rules that restrict college athletes.60
One case that dealt with the "celebrity" of a college athlete is Abdul-Jabbar v.
General Motors Corp., in which General Motors used the name of a former
college athlete and referenced his college achievements in an advertisement.61
While the plaintiff was not in college at the time the advertisement was created,
the court acknowledged the misappropriation of the plaintiffs college
likeness.62 While there has not been extensive application of the right of
5 Id. at 477-78.
5s See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Romantics v.
Activision Publ'g, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 884 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (both applying the
"transformative" test to right of publicity claims in video games).
56 See 6Grlv, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 616-17 (stating that the video game in question was
transformative because it added creative elements to create new expression).
5 Id. at 615. See also Romantics v. Activision Publ'g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 765 (E.D.
Mich. 2008) (stating that video games are expressive works protected by the First Amendment
right to free speech); E.S.S. Entm't 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012,
1039 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that the disputed video game "dearly" qualified for First
Amendment protection as an "artistic work"); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F.
Supp. 2d 1180, 1184 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (holding that the video games at issue were expressive
and protected by the First Amendment).
5 See IGrby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 615 (holding that the game was protected under the test set
forth in Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001)).
s9 Id. at 618.
6 See supra Part II.B (discussing the NCAA amatetirism rules).
61 Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1996).
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publicity to college athletes, Abdul-Jabbar shows that the likeness of a college
athlete is one that is protected by the right of publicity.63
B. NCAA AMATEURISM BYLAWS
Each year, the NCAA publishes the NCAA Manual, which includes
Operating Bylaws that govern the member institutions of the NCAA and their
athletes (the Bylaws). 64 The Bylaws require athletes to remain "amateurs" in
their sports.65 This amateurism requirement is enforced to maintain the
boundary between college and professional sports. 66 One way that a college
athlete can lose their amateur status is to accept pay or a promise of pay based
on their sport.67
There are multiple forms of prohibited pay under the Bylaws.68 These
forms include, but are not limited to, salary, gratuity, certain educational
expenses, payments based on performance, and preferential treatment, benefits
or services. 69 It is crucial to note that these prohibited forms of pay apply not
only to compensation actually received while in college, but also to pay
promised to be received following the completion of participation in NCAA
athletics.70
Compensation for the use of a college athlete's name or picture is
specifically addressed in the Bylaws.71  Section 12.5.2.1(a) states that an
individual will not be eligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics if the
individual "[a]ccepts any remuneration for or permits the use of his or her name
or picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a
commercial product or service of any kind."7 2 Section 12.5.2.2 asserts that if a
college athlete's name or picture is used on commercial items without that
individual's knowledge, the college athlete, or the institution on behalf of the
63 See id. (holding that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to state a right of publicity claim
under California statutory and common law).
64 This Note references the 2009-2010 version of the Bylaws printed for Division I member
schools. Manuals for different years and different athletic divisions may differ slightly.
65 See NCAA, supra note 4, § 12 (containing the bylaws governing amateurism and how a
college athlete retains amateur status).
66 Id. § 12.01.2 ("Member institutions' athletics programs are designed to be an integral part of
the educational program. The student-athlete is considered an integral part of the student body,
thus maintaining a ciear line of demarcation between college athletics and professional sports.").
67 Id. § 12.1.2 (listing the ways that an individual loses amateur status, including using "athletic
skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport" and accepting "a promise of pay
even if such pay is to be received following completion of intercollegiate athletics participation").
6- See §§ 12.1.2.1-.7 (listing the prohibited forms of pay).
69 Id.
70 Id. § 12.1.2(a)-(b).
71 See id. § 12.5.2 (regarding impermissible promotional activities).
72 Id. § 12.5.2.1(a).
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college athlete, must take steps to stop the prohibited use.73 In the context of
the use of players' names and pictures in video games, these sections have been
explained by an NCAA official to mean that "it is not permissible for a
commercial company to use the names of student athletes with eligibility
remaining in a computerized simulated sports game." 74 However, nothing in
these Bylaws specifically governs the use of a college athlete's likeness in a video
game.75 This has become one of the bases of the recent class action lawsuits
comprising the Likeness Licensing Lizgation filed by former college athletes
against the NCAA, Electronic Arts, and the CLC.76
C. COLLEGE ATHLETE SCHOLARSHIPS AS CONTRACTS
All NCAA college athletes must sign a series of documents as a prerequisite
to eligibility.77 Courts have held that scholarship documents, such as a letter of
intent, create a legal relationship between a college athlete and a university that
constitutes a contract.78 The consideration in the contract is the promise of the
university to provide educational financial aid in exchange for the college
athlete's promise to maintain eligibility to participate in college athletics.79 In
Taylor v. Wake Forest University, a student athlete sued his university for cancelling
his scholarship after he refused to participate in the football program.s0 The
court, in excusing the school from honoring the scholarship, found a
73 Id. § 12.5.2.2 (stating "if a student-athlete's name or picture appears on commercial items
(e.g., T-shirts, sweatshirts, serving trays, playing cards, posters) or is used to promote a
commercial product sold by an individual or agency without the student-athlete's knowledge or
permission, the student-athlete (or the institution acting on behalf of the student-athlete) is
required to take steps to stop such an activity in order to retain his or her eligibility for
intercollegiate athletics").
74 Matzkin, supra note 7, at 238 (citing Letter from Steve Mallonee, Director of Membership
Services/Division I Governance, Staff Liaison (Mar. 7, 1999) (on file with the author)).
75 See Anastasios Kaburakis, NCAA Student-Athletes' Rights of Publicity, EA Sports, and the Video
Game Industry: The Keller Forecast, 27 ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 15 (Summer 2009) (discussing a July
2008 official interpretation made by the NCAA of the amateurism bylaws that restated Section
12.5.2.2 without discussing its impact on video games).
76 See id. at 16 (acknowledging that the lack of clarity in the NCAA Bylaws provides the
framework under which to analyze the Keller case); Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note
14, at 3.
77 See NCAA, supra note 4, § 14.1.3 (requiring the college athlete to sign a form relating to
information about, inter aia, amateurism, with failure to submit such a form resulting in a
forfeiture of athletic eligibilty).
78 See, e.g., Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972); Ross v.
Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding a contractual relationship between
college athlete and university).
79 Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379, 382 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972). See also Michael J.
Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and the College National Letter of Intent: A Contract by Any Other
Name, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1275 (1989) (enumerating how the elements of offer, acceptance, and
consideration are achieved in the context of a letter of intent).
s0 191 S.E.2d at 380-82.
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contractual relationship in which the student received the scholarship in
exchange for his participation in the school's football program, and stated that
the student's failure to participate in the football program was a breach of the
contract.8'
This concept is important because under contract law, a contractual release
can extinguish an individual's right of publicity claim. 82  Because these
scholarship contracts implicitly adopt the Bylaws into their terms, it has been
argued that college athletes contractually give up their right of publicity to play
NCAA sports.83
D. SUGGESTED METHODS OF COMPENSATION FOR COLLEGE ATHLETES
Critics of the NCAA's amateurism rules have suggested various methods to
compensate college athletes for the use of their personas. One of these
methods is a revenue sharing program that would entail sharing profits
produced by a sport and disbursing those profits by percentages based on
seniority.84 The program would allow for additional compensation based on
both athletic and academic All-American achievement, and would allow college
athletes to enter into endorsement contracts.8 5 The driving force behind this
proposal is that the colleges that make money off of sports will share it with
their athletes, allowing athletes that are able to generate wealth with their image
to do so. 86
Another suggested method of compensation is to establish a trust for
college athletes that would be modeled after the International Olympic
Committee's (JOC) practice of setting up trust funds for amateur athletes.87
The college athlete would be able to pay expenses relating to education out of
the trust, and would receive the proceeds of the trust at the end of his collegiate
career.88 Under one proposed trust method, each college athlete would have a
81 Id. at 382.
82 See Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a signed contractual release
was a ground for dismissing a right of publicity claim).
83 See Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 8, at 295 (discussing how scholarship contracts effectually
take away college athletes' right of publicity).
84 Michael P. Acain, Note and Comment, Revenue Sharing: A Simple Cure for the Exploitation of
College Athletes, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 307, 337 (1998).
85 See id. at 336-43 (enumerating the forms of compensation that college athletes would be
entitled to under a proposed revenue sharing plan).
86 See id. at 353 (stating "A revenue-sharing plan . . . would ensure that those universities
making a profit fairly distribute these revenues to the student-athletes who helped raise the funds.
Finally, reliance on a revenue-sharing system would break the chains of exploitation binding
present-day collegiate athletics.").
87 Stephen M. Schott, Give Them What They Deserve: Compensating the Student-Athlete for
Pariiapation in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 SPORTs LAW J. 25, 45 (1996); Kenneth L. Shropshire,
Legislation for the Glog ofSport: Amatemism and Compensation, 1 SETON HALLJ. SPoRT L. 7, 18 (1991).
88 Schott, supra note 87, at 45.
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trust funded by various sources such as television rights, ticket sales, or booster
donations. Student athletes would receive stipends from these trusts based on
academic or athletic performance, incentivizing success both on the field and in
the classroom.89 Both of these options would require amendments to the
Bylaws relating to amateurism. 90
E. THE LIKENESS LICENSING LITIGATION
1. The Plaintiffs' Case. The Amended Consolidated Complaint states multiple
causes of action.91 It alleges in part that the NCAA and the CLC are violating
the NCAA amateurism rules by approving the production of the Electronic
Arts video games because the games are appropriating the likenesses of college
athletes for commercial use. 92 The Amended Consolidated Complaint further
alleges that Electronic Arts is intentionally appropriating the likenesses of
college athletes, and it shows examples of similarities between real college
athletes and the characters in the video games.93 Based on these allegations, the
plaintiff class claims that Electronic Arts, and the NCAA and CLC by
association, 94 are in violation of Indiana's and California's right of publicity
statutes, and are violating college athletes' common law right of publicity. 5
The class seeks multiple forms of relief.'6 With regards to the alleged
violations of the right of publicity, the plaintiffs seek actual, statutory, and
punitive damages; injunctive relief against the future use of college athletes'
names and likenesses; declaration that any contract provision or rule limiting the
right of college athletes to receive compensation for their alleged injuries is null
and void; and seizure and destruction of all video games in Defendants' and
other reachable third parties' possessions that infringe on college athletes' rights
of publicity.97
89 Id.
90 See Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 83, at 294 (stating that a trust would not work under NCAA
amateurism laws because it would be considered promise of pay after completion of college
athletics).
91 Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 14. This Note will only discuss the causes of
action relating to the right of publicity, but the Amended Consolidated Complaint also alleges
causes of action for civil conspiracy, violation of the Unfair Competition Act, breach of contract,
and unjust enrichment.
92 Id. at 137-39. No right of publicity claim is alleged directly against the NCAA or CLC.
However, through counts of civil conspiracy and breach of contract, the plaintiffs allege that the
NCAA and CLC are wrongfully assisting Electronic Arts in appropriating the plaintiffs'
likenesses.
93 Id. at 51-70.
94 Id.
9s Id. at 135-39; IND. CODE § 32-36-1-1 (2009); Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (2009).
96 Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 14, at 148-49. This Note will only discuss the
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2. Indiana Statutoy Right of Publitiy. The class contends that Electronic Arts
is violating Indiana's statutory right of publicity by allegedly appropriating "class
members' names, images, likenesses and distinctive appearances without their
consent in connection with and for the purposes of advertising, selling and
soliciting purchases of its videogames, including its NCAA Football, NCAA
Basketball and NCAA March Madness franchises."98  Electronic Arts is
allegedly subject to Indiana law because the claimed unlawful use of the
plaintiffs' likenesses occurs through Electronic Arts' sale of video games in the
state.9' The Indiana Code states that an attribute of an individual's personality
may not be used for a commercial purpose during the individual's lifetime, or
one hundred years after the individual's date of death, without the written
consent of the individual or their posthumous representative. 00 "Commercial
purpose" is defined as "(1) [o]n or in connection with a product, merchandise,
goods, services, or commercial activities. (2) For advertising or soliciting
purchases of products, merchandise, goods, services, or for promoting
commercial activities."' 0'
3. Caifornia Statutoy Right ofPublidly. Since Electronic Arts is headquartered
in California, and the alleged wrongful conduct of Electronic Arts occurred in
California,102 the class asserts that Electronic Arts also violated California's
statutory right of publicity because it allegedly "knowingly and intentionally
utilized and continue[s] to utilize the names and likenesses of Right of Publicity
Plaintiffs and class members in videogames produced by EA without the
consent of Right of Publicity Plaintiffs and class members."103 The statute
states that a person is liable for "knowingly [using] another's name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products,
merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting
purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person's
prior consent."1" However, the question under this statute is not only whether
the likeness is used in a commercial medium, but also whether the use is "so
directly connected with the commercial sponsorship or with the paid
advertising as to constitute a use for which consent is required under
subdivision (a)."105
It is important to recognize that the First Amendment preempts state
statutes.106 The state statutes creating a cause of action for right of publicity in
both California and Indiana are subject to the First Amendment's restrictions
98 Id. at 135.
99 Id. at 70; IND. CODE § 32-36-1-1 (2009).
100 IND. CODE § 32-36-1-8 (2009).
101 Id. § 32-36-1-2(1)-(2).
102 Amended Consolidated Complaint, .rupra note 14, at 70.
103 Id. at 136.
10 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (2009).
105 Id. § 3344(e).
106 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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on these rights.107 This means that even if the plaintiffs make out a statutory
case for the right of publicity, defendants can escape liability by proving that the
work is protected under the First Amendment right to free speech. 0 8
4. Cakfornia Common Law Rght of Publicity. In California, there are separate
causes of action for statutory and common law rights of publicity.109 As such,
the class asserts a separate count to allege that Electronic Arts is violating the
California common law right of publicity." 0
To state a claim for violation of a common law right of publicity, the
plaintiff must show "(1) the defendant's use of the plaintiffs identity; (2) the
appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness to defendant's advantage,
commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury."1"
However, even if a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case for right of publicity
protection, the defendants can plead a number of affirmative defenses.' 12
One important affirmative defense is the transformative use defense." 3 If a
work is found to be a transformative use under the "transformative" test, then
the work is protected under the First Amendment." 4 The burden lies with the
defendant to show that the use is transformative. 15 This defense is an example
of how the First Amendment right to freedom of expression limits both the
statutory and common law rights of publicity." 6
107 See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d
818, 821 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the First Amendment preempted a right of publicity claim);
Romantics v. Activision Publ'g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 766 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (same).
108 See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 616-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding
the First Amendment to be a complete defense to statutory and common law claims for right of
publicity); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
First Amendment was a complete defense even though plaintiff established a statutory cause of
action under CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344).
109 See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that dismissal of the
statutory cause of action does not preclude plaintiffs right to pursue action under common law
right of publicity); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the fact that a plaintiff cannot assert a statutory right of publicity claim does not
necessarily preclude a common law right of publicity claim).
110 Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra note 14, at 137.
11 Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting White, 971 F.2d at
1397).
112 See, e.g., Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1071-73 (analyzing a number of affirmative defenses to
the right of publicity the defendants raised); Romantics, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 765 (holding that
although the plaintiffs had a "cognizable claim," it was subject to affirmative defenses).
113 See Bmwne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1072 (describing the "transformative use" affirmative defense
as a First Amendment bar to a right of publicity claim when the likeness is so transformed so as
to become the defendant's own expression).
114 See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the "transformative" test).
115 Bmwne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
116 See Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797, 808 (2001) (stating that a transformative use of one's likeness is
entitled to First Amendment protection); Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (2003) (holding
that because the work was transformative it was entitled to First Amendment protection).
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5. The Defendants'Arguments. Before the individual cases were consolidated,
the NCAA, the CLC, and Electronic Arts raised numerous defenses'"7 and filed
motions to dismiss the Keller Complaint, from which the allegations in the
Amended Complaint are primarily derived." 8 These motions were denied in
part and granted in part in the Keller action because the defenses were not
sufficient to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims as a matter of law.119 Despite their
denial, these motions effectively demonstrate how the Defendants intend to
overcome the right of publicity claims throughout the Likeness Licensing
Lifigation.
One significant change in the plaintiffs' position since the filing of the
motions to dismiss is that in the Keller complaint the Indiana statutory claim was
alleged against only the NCAA, whereas in the Amended Consolidated
Complaint the Indiana statutory claim is alleged against only Electronic Arts.120
This is most likely because the court dismissed the Keller Indiana statutory claim
against the NCAA because the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that the
NCAA "used" the likenesses as required by the statute.121 Although the Indiana
statutory claim is no longer alleged against the NCAA, Electronic Arts will likely
utilize the defense presented in the NCAA's motion to dismiss the Keller action
in the Likeness Licensing DLigation. Other than this difference, the motions to
dismiss accurately convey the arguments that the Defendants will pose to
combat the plaintiffs' right of publicity claims.
In its motion to dismiss, the NCAA alleged that the plaintiffs failed to
establish that their likenesses have "commercial value" as required by the
Indiana statute.122 As this is a prerequisite to establishing a statutory claim,
Electronic Arts will likely argue that the plaintiffs cannot show that their
likenesses have a commercial value.
117 See Defendant NCAA's Notice of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and Statement of Relief Sought, Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 09-1967-CV (N.D.
Cal. July 29, 2009) [hereinafter NCAA Motion to Dismiss]; Electronic Arts, Inc.'s Notice of
Motion and Motion to Dismiss the Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Keller v. Elec.
Arts, Inc., No. 09-1967-CV (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2009) [hereinafter Electronic Arts Motion to
Dismiss] (making separate arguments for dismissal). This Note will only address those defenses
relating to the right of publicity claims.
118 Class Action Complaint, subra note 11.
119 See Order on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and Electronic Arts' Anti-Slapp Motion to
Strike, Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 09-1967-CV (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (granting the NCAA's
motion to dismiss the Indiana statutory claim with leave to amend, and denying Electronic Arts'
motion to dismiss the California statutory and common law claims).
120 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 11, at 18; Amended Consolidated Complaint, supra
note 14, at 135-39.
121 Order on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and Electronic Arts' Anti-Slapp Motion to Strike,
supra note 119, at 5.
122 NCAA Motion to Dismiss, supra note 117, at 6.
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With respect to the California statutory and common law claims, Electronic
Arts asserts both First Amendment protection and a state statute exception.123
It claims multiple grounds for protection under the First Amendment.124 First,
Electronic Arts contends that video games are expressive works, and are
consequently protected as "transformative" under the First Amendment.125
Second, Electronic Arts argues that there is a substantial public interest in
sports and athletes that "far outweighs" athletes' rights of publicity, so these
video games are due "substantial constitutional protection."126 This argument is
the product of litigation over the right of publicity and sports fantasy leagues.127
In addition to these First Amendment defenses, Electronic Arts asserts that
the plaintiffs' statutory claim is barred by the "public affairs" exception to the
California statute.128 This statutory exception states that a likeness used "in
connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any
political campaign, shall not constitute a use for which consent is required."129
Electronic Arts alleges that the statutory exception is intended to protect even
more works than the First Amendment.130 The argument continues that since
"public affairs" include works that relate to "popular culture" and "real-life
occurrences," these video games are works "in connection. . . with public
affairs" and are therefore protected by California's statutory exception.131
III. DISCUSSION: COLLEGE ATHLETE COMPENSATION LEGALLY AND
THEORETICALLY UNLIKELY
Based on the state of the right of publicity, video games, and college
athletics today, the Likeness Licensing Lizgadon plaintiffs should not be entitled to
compensation for the Electronic Arts video games for a number of reasons.
First, the Likeness Licensing Litigaion plaintiffs have not met the statutory
requirements for a right of publicity claim in either Indiana or California, nor
have they met common law requirements in California. Second, video games
are protected under the First Amendment as expressive works, and there is no
reason that these particular games should be excepted from this classification.
Even though the court denied some of these arguments as grounds for
dismissing the case as a matter of law, they are still valid defenses that are more
123 Electronic Arts Motion to Dismiss, supra note 117, at 1.
124 Id. at 7.
125 Id
126 Id
127 See id. (citing decisions of fantasy league cases for the proposition that public interest in
sports and athletes outweighs an athlete's right of publicity).
128 Id at 13.
129 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (2009).
130 Electronic Arts Motion to Dismiss, supra note 117, at 17 (citing New Kids on the Block v.
News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 310 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992)).
131 Id. at 18.
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appropriately affirmed after the facts surrounding this dispute are determined.132
Furthermore, college athletes have essentially signed their right of publicity
away to the NCAA and its member schools in exchange for the opportunity to
play college sports. Finally, a compensation system for college athletes would
have tremendous transaction costs, which, if undertaken, would ultimately
reduce NCAA member schools' abilities to award scholarships to other athletes.
A. STATUTORY RIGHT OF PUBLICITY REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT MET
Two of the Likeness Licensing Liigation causes of action are based on the
Indiana and California right of publicity statutes.133 Both of these statutes have
exceptions that allow for some works to use an individual's likeness without
consent. The video games in dispute fall under statutory exceptions in both
states.
1. The Indiana Statute. The Indiana right of publicity statute does not apply
to "an entertainment medium that: ... (ii) does not convey or reasonably
suggest that a personality endorses the. . . entertainment medium."134 This
exception applies to the Electronic Arts games because college athletes are not
being used to advertise the games. The players on the covers of the games are
former college athletes that have given Electronic Arts permission to use their
pictures.135 There are hundreds of virtual college players in this video game; so
many, that it is unrealistic to believe that all of them are individually endorsing
the video game.
The Indiana statute also states that it does not "affect rights and privileges
recognized under any other law that apply to ... an entertainment medium."'3 6
This means that it is subject to any privilege extended by the First Amendment.
Thus, if these video games are protected by the First Amendment, by the text
of this statute and by way of preemption, there is no Indiana statutory cause of
action.137
2. The Cakfornia Statute. To state a cause of action under the California
statute, the use of the individual's likeness must be directly connected with
commercial sponsorship. 3 8 In these games, there are hundreds of virtual
132 See Order on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and Electronic Arts' Anti-Slapp Motion to
Strike, Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., supra note 119, at 10 (rejecting Electronic Arts' defenses "at this
stage" of the litigation).
133 See supra Part II.E.2-3 (discussing plaintiffs' statutory causes of action).
'3 IND. CODE 32-36-1-1(c)(1)(D)(ii) (2009).
135 See EA, EA Announces Four NCAA Football 10 CoverAthletes, http://www.ea.com/news/ea-a
nnounces-four-ncaa-football-10-cover-athletes (last visited Aug. 12, 2010) (announcing cover
athletes whose NCAA eligibility ended before their likenesses were used).
136 IND. CODE § 32-36-1-1(b) (2009).
137 See infa Part III.B (discussing how Electronic Arts' video games are protected by the First
Amendment).
138 See supra Part II.E.3 (discussing the California right of publicity statute).
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athletes from which the user can choose. The sheer number of athletes makes
it impossible to directly connect any one, in particular, to commercial
sponsorship of the games. Since the Likeness licensing Liigation plaintiffs have
not proven that their likenesses are directly connected to the commercial
sponsorship of the games, they cannot establish a statutory right of publicity
claim.
Section 3344(d) exempts from liability works in connection with affairs of
public interest.139 This exception is arguably broader than the protection
afforded by the First Amendment because it is "designed to avoid First
Amendment questions in the area of misappropriation by providing extra
breathing space for the use of a person's name in connection with matters of
public interest."40 In Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, the defendants
disseminated statistics, photographs, and factual data about the athletes to the
public through websites, game programs and broadcasts. 141 In this case, the
"public affairs" exemption was invoked to protect a variety of publications
released by the defendant because of baseball's "pervasive influence" on
American culture.142 College athletics have the same "pervasive influence" in
our culture. This is demonstrated by the extensive broadcasting and promotion
of college sports each year. The NCAA's revenues from marketing fees display
the public's interest in college sports.143 Thus, the reasoning in Gionfriddo is
applicable to college athletics for the same policy reason of public interest.
Consequently, the California statutory right of publicity claim cannot stand
because the video games fall within the public affairs exception protected by
Section 3344(d).
Even if the games do not fall under the "public affairs" exception, this
statute is still subject to the limitations of the First Amendment.144 Because of
the First Amendment's preemptive power, even if these statutory exceptions are
not found to be sufficient, the Defendants will be able to show that these video
games are protected by the First Amendment to rebut both the statutory and
the common law right of publicity claims.
139 See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text (discussing the "public affairs" exception to
the California right of publicity statute).
140 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 310 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992).
141 141 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 314 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
142 Id. at 318-19.
143 See sypra Part I (showing NCAA's revenues from television and marketing).
144 See supra Part II.E.3 (discussing First Amendment preemption).
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B. ELECTRONIC ARTS NCAA VIDEO GAMES ARE PROTECTED BY THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
It is well settled that video games are a form of expression generally
protected by the First Amendment. 145 However, this does not automatically
mean that there is no right of publicity claim with regard to video games. In
making this determination, the Rogers test and the "transformative" test are used
to determine whether the likenesses are so transformed so as to be the
defendant's own expression. 146 This process of deciding whether a work is
protected by the First Amendment is a factually intensive process, and as such,
is not necessarily appropriate for a motion to dismiss standard.147 Nevertheless,
the Electronic Arts games at issue in the Likeness Lcensing Lizgation pass the
Rogers test and the "transformative" test. The games at issue are similar to other
games previously protected; as such, they are entitled to First Amendment
protection from college athletes' rights of publicity claims.
1. NCAA Video Games Pass the Rogers Test. Based on the Rogers test, there is
no violation of the college athletes' rights of publicity. This requires a two-part
analysis.148 These games pass the first part of the test because the likenesses of
the college athletes have artistic relevance to the underlying work. In Rogers v.
Grimaldi, the use of the title "Ginger and Fred" was considered artistically
relevant because it was chosen not to exploit the real Ginger and Fred, but
because it had genuine relevance to the story.149 Here, the likenesses of the
college athletes are not just being used to exploit the athletes; they are being
used to create the feeling of being "in the game." The college athletes are
artistically relevant to the overall feel of the game.
The second part of the Rogers test is satisfied because the video games do not
explicitly mislead as to the source or content of the work. In Rogers, the court
found that although there was some confusion as to the meaning of the
"Ginger and Fred" title, it was not explicitly misleading, and therefore the risk
of confusion was outweighed by the danger of suppressing an artistically
relevant title.o50 The source of the NCAA games is far less confusing than the
situation posed in Rogers. The college athletes' likenesses are arguably used as
145 See, e.g., Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir. 2009);
E.S.S. Entm't 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1039 (C.D. Cal. 2006);
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1184 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (all
holding that video games are entitled to First Amendment protection).
146 See supra notes 39-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Rogers test and the
"transformative" test, as well as the right of publicity in video games).
147 Order on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and Electronic Arts' Anti-Slapp Motion to Strike,
supra note 119, at 10.
148 See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text (discussing the Rogers test).
149 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1001 (2d Cir. 1989). This part of the Rogers Court analysis
pertained specifically to the Lanham Act, but was later qualified as the same reason for dismissal
of the right of publicity claim.
1so Id at 1001.
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virtual characters in the video games. There are hundreds of virtual characters
in the games that are only associated with a college team in certain game modes.
Thus, there is likely little chance these games mislead purchasers to believe that
the college athletes are the source of the content. For these reasons, these
video games pass the Rogers test and are entitled to protection from the Likeness
Licensing Litigation right of publicity claims under the First Amendment.
2. NCAA Video Games Pass the 'Transformadve" Test. For the same reasons
that the court in Winter v. DC Comics decided that the comic books were
protected by the First Amendment, the NCAA football and basketball game
characters are "transformative" because they are not the "very sum and
substance" of the work in question.'5' The NCAA football and basketball
video games use jerseys and school information that are properly licensed. The
games also have modes that allow a player created by the user to evolve in skill
and ability as they continue to play the game with greater frequency.152 These
are elements that do not involve or concern the likenesses of any college
athletes, yet are elements that constitute a significant part of the video games.
Because the college athletes' likenesses are only a part of the "raw materials,"
not the "sum and substance" of the video games in question, the video games
are expressive works protected by the First Amendment. 5 3
3. NCA4A Sports Video Games are Similar to Other Protected Games. The
Electronic Arts games fall in line with other video games that have been
protected as expressive works under the First Amendment. The holding in
Kirby v. Sega ofAmerica, Inc. was a result of the court's finding that the character
was more than just a literal depiction of the plaintiff.154 The game character in
Kirby was similar to the plaintiff in some respects, but there were also a number
of differences between the character and the plaintiff. The court noted that the
game character wore different types of clothing and further specified
differences in physical characteristics.155 Similarly, the virtual characters in the
NCAA games are more than just literal depictions of college athletes. In the
majority of the game modes, the characters can be altered and morphed during
the course of play to be completely different from any actual college athlete.
For example, in "EA NCAA Football 2010" the user can play in the "Road to
Glory" mode. In this mode, the user creates a virtual player that starts his
career as a high school senior, and then is recruited and changes through his
college career as the user plays the game. 5 6 Thus, some of the virtual players
151 See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (discussing Winter).
152 Electronic Arts Motion to Dismiss, supra note 117, at 11.
153 See Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 477-78 (Cal. 2003) (discussing what constitutes "raw
materials" and "sum and substance" under the "transformative" test).
'54 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text
(discussing the Kirby holding).
155 Id. at 613.
156 NCAA Football 2010 'Road to Glory Mode' trailer HD, http://gamevideos.lup.com/vi
deo/id/25375 (last visited Aug. 12, 2010).
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are more than literal depictions of the athletes, while others are not associated
with any actual college athlete at all.
In Romantics v. Actvision Publishing, Inc., the court decided that one of the
games in the Guitar Hero series was protected by the First Amendment from
right of publicity claims.' 57 The plaintiffs argued that the game did not involve
a complex story line because there was no script, story board, character
development, or dialogue.'58 A similar argument might be made about the
Electronic Arts games because they allow players to pick teams and play
football, just like the Guitar Hem games allow players to pick a character and
song to play on the guitar. However, just as this argument failed in Romantics, it
must fail here because the games allow players to customize their own play
experiences by picking teams and locations that are properly licensed, and by
creating teams that develop skills as the game is played.'5 9 The Romantics court
held that these customizing capabilities were sufficient to show creativity and
classify a game as an expressive work entitled to First Amendment
protection.160 Thus, the intricacies of the Electronic Arts games should afford
it the same First Amendment protection.
C. COLLEGE ATHLETES HAVE CONTRACTUALLY RELEASED THEIR RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY
College athletes that are on athletic scholarship at their playing institution
have an implicit contractual relationship with the NCAA to adhere to the
Bylaws.161 The Bylaws make it clear that NCAA college athletes cannot receive
any form of compensation for the use of their likenesses.162 Thus, it follows
that college athletes have, in exchange for eligibility to play NCAA sports, given
up their right of publicity for the duration of their college sports careers.
Some argue that these scholarship contracts, which restrict the rights of
college athletes, are unconscionable contracts of adhesion.163 However, this
view ignores the fact that players with the skill and ability to play at the
professional level, generally most of the athletes that have lucrative college
careers, have the option of completely forgoing college athletics and signing
with a professional league.164 It also does not consider that many college
157 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 765 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
158 Id. at 766 (holding that the customizable game features were sufficiently expressive to
warrant First Amendment protection).
159 Electronic Arts Motion to Dismiss, supra note 117, at 10.
160 Romanics, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 766.
161 See supra Part II.c.
162 See supra Part II.B.
163 See Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 8, at 294 (stating that athletes have no choice of terms and
are compelled to sign these "take-it-or-leave-it" scholarships).
164 See Kaburakis, supra note 75, at 20 (discussing athletes' alternatives to playing college
athletics before entering domestic professional sports).
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athletes arguably exploit the college scholarship system because they do not
fulfill their four-year commitment to their school, choosing instead to terminate
their NCAA eligibility to become professional as soon as they are able.165
Based on these considerations, college scholarship athletes choose to be
bound by the amateurism rules of the NCAA. They are essentially estopped
from claiming that they are entitled to compensation because they sign these
contracts knowing that they will receive only scholarships. 166 These athletes
give up their right of publicity to their school, and implicitly to the NCAA as
the governing body of all of its member schools, so they can make no right of
publicity claims for the use of their likenesses.167 These scholarship contracts
act as releases of the NCAA college athletes' right of publicity to the NCAA
and its member schools.
D. PROBLEMS WITH PROPOSED COMPENSATION SCHEMES
The Likeness Licensing Lizgation plaintiffs seek monetary damages for the
alleged violation of their rights of publicity.'68 If the plaintiffs were to prevail in
the Likeness Licensing Liuzgation, the court would have to deal with how college
athletes should be compensated for the use of their rights of publicity. This
presents the complicated issue of college athlete compensation and all of the
policy considerations within.
Scholars have suggested numerous forms of compensation for college
athletes.169  All of these pay structures fail for similar reasons. First,
compensating college athletes would breed tax and workers compensation
issues for schools and athletes alike.170 Each compensation structure also
carries the burden of high transaction costs and the destruction of amateurism
in college athletics.
NCAA Division I has 388 member schools' 7' that sponsor 6,272 teams.172
When college athlete compensation is considered, it is important to keep in
165 See id. (discussing the debate over whether amateurism benefits talented athletes or NCAA
teams).
166 See Cozzillo, supra note 79, at 1356 (discussing promissory estoppel in the letter of intent as a
way of inferring promises implicit in the letter).
167 See Kaburakis, supra note 75, at 20 (expressing that college athletes may have assigned their
rights of publicity to schools through their scholarships).
168 See supra Part II.E.1.
169 See supra Part II.D.
170 See Thomas R. Hurst & J. Grier Pressly III, Payment of Student-Athletes: Legal & Practical
Obstacles, 7 VLL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 55, 70-71, 73-75 (2000) (discussing, the workers
compensation and taxation issues that arise with the suggested compensation of college athletes).
171 Composition & Sport Sponsorship of the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?Key=/
ncaa/NCAA/About%20The%20NCAA/Membership/membership-breakdown.html (last visited
Aug. 12,2010).
172 Division I APR Data Continue to Reveal Academic Improvement, Some Concerns (2008),
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?ContentlD=330 (last visited Aug. 12, 2010).
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mind the staggering number of individuals involved in this discussion. Some
have suggested trusts similar to those formed for Olympic athletes. 73 These are
individual trusts, and while there are thousands of Olympic athletes,174
management of these trusts is more realistic because there are multiple National
Olympic Associations (NOAs) to manage the trusts. However, the NCAA is
the sole organization that oversees these thousands of college athletes, which
would make the management of a trust for each college athlete much more
onerous. Even if one large trust is created for all college athletes, there would
be thousands of potential college athlete beneficiaries, so the process would
require extensive reporting to determine amounts of compensation for each
athlete under the trust.
Another major problem with college athlete compensation is the
opportunity cost of distributing payments to college athletes rather than
member schools. The cost of implementing college athlete compensation for
Division I institutions would be an estimated $30 million annually. 75
Compounding the burden that any form of compensation might affect, many
schools are facing treacherous financial times and are being forced to cut
budgets, and sometimes entire sports.17 6 Currently, this estimated $30 million
goes back to the schools to fund non-revenue producing sports and athletic
scholarships.'77 Taking this money away from schools to give it to college
athletes does more harm than good. It gives college athletes a small amount of
money, but drastically shrinks the ability of schools to create more scholarships
and sports for students to play.'78 Thus, college athlete compensation is not
something that schools can afford.
IV. CONCLUSION: COLLEGE ATHLETES LOSE THE BATTLE AND THE WAR
The line between professional and intercollegiate sports is finer than it has
ever been. The battle over the college athlete's right of publicity in video games
represents one of the gray areas that clouds the demarcation. However, the
outcome of the Likeness Licensing Litigation will be one that helps retain the
amateurism of intercollegiate athletics by preventing college athletes from being
173 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (discussing the IOC trust structure).
174 NOC entry forms received (Aug. 1, 2008), http://en.beijing2008.cn/news/official/prepara
tion/n214496035.shtml.
1s See Hurst & Pressly, supra note 170, at 76 (estimating costs based on a monthly stipend of
$300 for athletes, with individual budgets estimated at $400,000 annually).
176 See id. at 76-77 (discussing how many college athletic programs operate at a loss). See also
Mark Schlabach, ADs Eye Level Financial Field, ESPN.coM, July 17, 2009, http://sports.espn.go.
com/ncaa/columns/story?columnist=schlabach_mark&id=4333252 (discussing the financial
troubles of college athletics programs in 2009).
177 See Hurst & Pressly, supra note 170, at 76-77.
17s Id. (noting that requiring schools to compensate college athletes would force many schools
to eliminate non-revenue producing sports).
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compensated for the use of their likenesses. This is the correct result for a
number of reasons.
Video games are inherently expressive works that are entitled to First
Amendment protection from right of publicity claims. Assuming that the
college athlete's likeness is actually appropriated, the college sports video games
contain enough creative elements that transcend mere imitation to warrant
protection under the First Amendment.
The incorporation of NCAA amateurism rules into college scholarship
contracts further warrants the dismissal of the Likeness Licensing Liigaion.
College athletes choose to participate in intercollegiate athletics. The athletes
sign contracts to play a sport for a school and receive tuition-free education in
return. These contracts incorporate the Bylaws that prohibit college athletes
from receiving compensation. This prohibition is known to prospective college
athletes when they elect to participate in intercollegiate athletics. Awarding
compensation for college athletes' rights of publicity would contradict the
implicit terms of the scholarship contracts signed by these individuals.
Finally, in terms of practicality, the interests of all are best served by denying
college athletes individual compensation. All proposed compensation schemes
entail large management and expense burdens that schools and the NCAA
would have to bear. These resources, which would be exhausted providing
meager compensation to each one of the thousands of college athletes, are best
put to use creating additional educational and intercollegiate athletic
opportunities for a larger number of athletes. The Likeness Licensing Litzgaion
will mark a milestone in the college athlete compensation war. It should
reinforce the rule that college athletes are not entitled to compensation for the
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